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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Moses Richard Delarosa appeals from his Judgment and Commitment and Order 
of Retained Jurisdiction. Mr. Delarosa was found guilty, by a jury, of one count of 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. Following the successful 
completion of a period of retained jurisdiction, he was placed on probation. 
On Appeal, Mr. Delarosa that the district court erred in denying his 
motion for a mistrial. Deputy Sessions testified that Mr. Delarosa told him that he had 
the grey that contained methamphetamine in his when he left the 
The district court ordered the testimony stricken due to potential suppression 
issues related to a failure to give Miranda 1 warnings. Although the district court 
instructed the jury to disregard the testimony, Mr. Delarose asserts that the instruction 
to the jury was insufficient because the testimony may have still influenced the verdict in 
this case. Mr. Delarosa's concerns were validated when the jury asked a question 
specifically concerning the stricken testimony. Due to the error in denying the motion 
for mistrial, this Court should vacate Mr. Delarosa's conviction and remand his case for 
a new trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On April 24, 2013, an Information was filed charging Mr. Delarosa with 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. (R., pp.20-21.) He entered a 
not guilty plea to the charge. (R., pp.22-23.) The case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.68-
92.) 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). 
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At trial, the State presented the testimony of one of the arresting officers, Officer 
Chad Benson; a County Jail intake officer, Deputy Thomas Sessions; and a forensic 
scientist, Heather Campbell. ( See generally Tr. 10/8/13 and 10/9/13.) During Deputy 
Sessions testimony information about what Mr. Delarosa had told Deputy Sessions 
regarding the grey tube was found to have been improperly admitted. (Tr. ·10/8/13, 
p.160, Ls.18-21, p.166, Ls.20-24.) The district court struck the testimony and instructed 
the jury that they could not consider the testimony. (Tr. 10/8/13, p.170, Ls.11-18.) 
Defense counsel asserted that the error could not be cured by an instruction and 
requested a mistrial. (Tr. 10/8/13, p.167, Ls.4-18.) The request was denied. 
(Tr. 10/8/13, p.167, L.19-p.168, L.19.) 
Following both parties resting, the final jury instructions, and closing arguments, 
the jury retired to deliberate. (Tr. 10/9/13, p.49, Ls.12-20.) During deliberations, the 
jury sent a question to the district court asking, "Was there any testimony on how the 
tube got into the defendant's pocket? Specifically, is there written testimony to which 
we can refer?" (R., p.123; Tr. 10/9/13, p.50, Ls.3-6.) The district court informed the jury 
that, "It is for the jury using their collective recollection, to determine what the testimony 
was. I have instructed you as to what evidence you may consider and I have also 
instructed you as to what evidence you may not consider .... " (R., p.124.) 
Mr. Delarosa was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance. 
(R., p.125.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years 
fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.158-160.) A Notice of Appeal was filed timely 
from the Judgment and Commitment and Order of Retained Jurisdiction.2 (R, pp.155-
158.) Following the successful completion of the period of retained jurisdiction 
2 
Mr. Delarosa was placed on probation. (Augmentation: Order of Probation Suspended 
Execution of Judgment After Retained Jurisdiction.)3 
2 The Notice of Appeal was filed prematurely, after the oral pronouncement of judgment 
and sentence, but prior to the filing of the appealable order. See I.A.R.17(e)(2). 
3 A Motion to Augment was filed on 10/20/14 and is currently pending. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by failing to declare a mistrial after the jury heard testimony by 
Deputy Sessions that Mr. Delarosa had made statements regarding his possession of 
the grey tube in which methamphetamine residue had been found? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Failing To Declare A Mistrial After The Jury Heard 
Testimony By Deputy Sessions That Mr. Delarosa Had Made Statements Regarding His 
Possession Of The Grey Tube In Which Methamphetamine Residue Had Been Found 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Delarosa asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for a 
mistrial because the testimony regarding the statements he made to the intake deputy, 
was stricken by the court and, therefore, inadmissible. Although the jury was told to 
disregard the testimony, it appears from the jury's question that they were unsure if they 
could consider the evidence and, as such, it may have contributed to the jury verdict. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Delarosa's Motion For A 
Mistrial 
A motion for a mistrial is controlled by I.C.R. 29.1, which provides that "[a] mistrial 
may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an 
error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, 
which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial." I.C.R. 
29.1 (a); State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1996). Idaho's appellate courts 
effectively review denials of motions for mistrial de novo. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 
571 (2007). 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge 
reasonably exercised his discretion in light of circumstances 
existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the 
question must be whether the event which precipitated the 
motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed 
in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for 
mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of 
discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more 
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is 
upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that 
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to 
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declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, 
viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error. 
Id. (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 (2003) (quoting 
State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct App. 1993) (quoting State v. Urquhart, 105 
Idaho 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1983))). Additionally, the appellate courts first determine if there 
was error, then decide whether it was harmless. Id. 
Mr. Delarose asserts that the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant 
a mistrial. During the trial, Intake Deputy Sessions was asked if Mr. Delarosa had said 
anything about the grey tube. (Tr. 10/8/13, p.60, Ls.14-15.) Defense counsel objected. 
(Tr. 10/8/13, p.160, L.16.) He was then allowed to answer the question and stated, "I 
asked him what it was, and he told me that he had picked it up. He didn't tell me exactly 
what it was. He told me he had picked it up on his way out of the house that day." 
(Tr. 10/8/13, p.160, Ls.18-21.) Deputy Sessions continued, testifying that after the 
conversation he had the tube placed on the counter, preformed a canine sniff, and the 
dog alerted on the tube. (Tr. 10/8/13, p.160, L.25 - p.161, L.12.) Shortly thereafter, the 
State concluded its questioning and defense counsel asked for a recess to address an 
issue. (Tr. 10/8/13, p.161, Ls.20-24.) 
During the break, concerns were raised that defense counsel had not been made 
aware of these statements by Mr. Delarosa and that there was no evidence that he had 
been Mirandized prior to being interrogated about the item. (Tr. 10/8/13. p.162, L.24 
p.164, L.17.) Based on these concerns, counsel asked the evidence be stricken and 
moved for a mistrial. (Tr. 10/8/13, p.164, Ls.18-24.) The district court sustained the 
objection, ordered the testimony about the statement stricken, and noted that he would 
instruct the jury to disregard that portion of the testimony based on the lack of proof that 
Mr. Delarosa had received Miranda warnings. (Tr. 10/8/13, p.166, Ls.20-24.) Defense 
6 
counsel again requested a mistrial stating that the bell could not be unrung and that he 
did not believe a jury instruction could cure the comment. (Tr. 10/8/13, p.167, Ls.4-18.) 
The district court noted that it did not find the evidence especially prejudicial, noted that 
he believed the jury could disregard the information and follow an instruction, and again 
denied the motion for mistrial. (Tr. 10/8/13, p.167, L.19- p.168, L.19.) 
The district court instructed the jury that: 
Members of the jury, just before the break Mr. Bazzoli objected the 
testimony of this officer regarding statements made by the defendant. I 
would advise you at this time that I have sustained that objection. That 
testimony is inadmissible. It is ordered stricken, and I specifically instruct 
that you not consider the testimony in any fashion whatsoever in rendering 
our verdicts in this case. 
(Tr. 10/8/13, p.170, Ls.11-18.) 
Some of the central questions in a possession of a controlled substance case are 
whether the person knew they possessed a controlled substance and whether they had 
physical control or the power and intent to control it. Certainly, Mr. Delarosa had 
physical control of the tube because it was found in his pocket. So, the question in this 
case is whether Mr. Delarosa knew he was in possession of a controlled substance. 
The testimony that was stricken supports the allegation that he knew he was in 
possession of a controlled substance and, as such, likely contributed to Mr. Delarosa's 
conviction. 
The grey tube that contained methamphetamine looked "basically" like a "Bic-
type pen" with both ends pulled off. (Tr. 10/8/13, p.146, Ls.17-25.) It is not 
unreasonable that any person could be carrying such an item and not know that it 
contained a controlled substance. According to the State's witness, methamphetamine 
cannot be tested to see how old it is and does not decompose, rot, or change form over 
time. (Tr. 10/8/13, p.213, Ls.7-25.) As such, the tube could have had 
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methamphetamine placed in it or been to months, 
or even earlier. 
If Mr. Delarosa had this like item in baggy pants it is possible he was 
unaware it was in his pants. After all, during the initial pat down search, the item was 
not discovered. (Tr. 10/8/13, 143, L.16 p.1 L.2) However, testimony that 
Mr. Delarosa had picked it upon his way out of the house that day demonstrates his 
knowledge of the tube. (Tr. 10/8/13, p.160, Ls.20-21.) The stricken testimony 
contradicts the possibility that Mr. Delarosa was unaware the item was in his pants. 
In this case, there is a danger that the jury did not disregard the stricken 
testimony, but that it considered it to Mr. Delarosa's detriment. The appellate courts 
review a motion for mistrial in light of the entire record. Field, 1 Idaho at 571. Instead 
of looking just at the propriety of the district court's actions in regard to the 
circumstances giving rise to the objection in isolation, the appellate court must consider 
the continuing impact on the trial. Id. As evidenced by their question to the district 
court, the jury in Mr. Delarosa's case was clearly not able to understand what testimony 
had been stricken and what testimony they could consider. During deliberations, the 
jury sent a question to the district court asking, "Was there any testimony on how the 
tube got into the defendant's pocket? Specifically, is there written testimony to which 
we can refer?" (R., p.123, Tr. 10/9/13, p.50, L.3-6.) The district court responded as 
follows: 
IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO.1, I would advise you as follows: 
It is for the jury using their collective recollection, to determine what 
the testimony was. I have instructed you as to what evidence you may 
consider and I have also instructed you as to what evidence you may not 
consider. 
You have with you in the jury room State's Exhibit 2. That is the 
only exhibit that was admitted at trial. If you are asking about a transcript 
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of the testimony I would advise you that there is no transcript of the 
testimony. I could have the court reporter read back a portion of the 
testimony if you can sufficiently narrow or identify the portion you are 
interested in hearing. We would have to have Ms. Saunders who was the 
court reporter yesterday come in, which could certainly be done, if your 
area of interest concerns testimony from yesterday. 
(R., p.124, Tr. 10/9/13, p.50, L.11 - p.51, L.2.) This answer, while acknowledged as 
proper by the State and defense, did not actually tell the jury whether or not there was 
testimony about how the tube got into Mr. Delarosa's pocket that they could consider. 
As such, despite the jury's best effort to follow instructions, they, at a minimum, 
discussed the stricken testimony during deliberation trying to determine whether or not 
such evidence could be considered and, at worst, considered the stricken testimony in 
determining the guilty verdict. The jury's question illustrates defense counsel's concern 
that the bell could not be unrung and that the jury would be unable to not consider the 
evidence. As such, it was error for the district court to not declare a mistrial. 
C. The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Denial Of Mr. Delarosa's Motion 
For A Mistrial Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
The harmless error doctrine has been defined by this Court: 'To hold an error as 
harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the 
conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous 
objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden 
of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 227 (2010). 
9 
Mr. Delarosa asserts that for reasons articulated in Section 8 the State will not be 
able to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the denial of his suppression motion was 
harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Delarosa respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and 
remand this case for a new trial 
DATED this 30 th day of October, 2014. 
() 
'" '' --,:,. 
ELIZABETH ANN ACLRED 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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